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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last quarter century, conservation easements on land
evolved into an established and widely used mechanism to protect the
natural values of real property and historic buildings in perpetuity.
Water rights often support conservation easements on open space and
agricultural lands, and may be essential to maintain associated
conservation values such as wildlife habitat, wetlands, and other water
dependant natural values.
Conservation easements may also offer an economically attractive
way to maintain irrigated lands, wetlands, and other uses of water
independently, including instream flows' and littoral levels2 in
t Attorney at law, Peter D. Nichols LLC, Carbondale, Colorado, Executive
Director, Colorado Water Trust. Former Chair, Colorado Water Quality Control

Commission. B.A., Colorado College; M.P.A., University of Colorado Graduate School
of Public Affairs; J.D., University of Colorado School of Law. The author is indebted to
the following for their critical review and constructive comments: Michael Browning,

James Corbridge, Kelly Custer, David Getches, David Robbins, Charles B. "Barney"
White, and Robert Wigington. Any errors remain, of course, solely the author's
responsibility.

1. The Colorado Water Conservation Board has exclusive authority to appropriate
and hold minimum stream flows to preserve "the natural environment to a reasonable
degree." COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102(3), -103(4), -305(9) (9) (2001). Colorado's
minimum stream flow program is both generally understood and widely reviewed. See,
e.g., Steven J. Shupe, The Legal Evolution of Colorado's Instream Flow Program, 17 COLO.
LAW. 861 (1988);Jane E. Lein, Protectionof InstreamRows: The Aspen Wilderness Workshop
Decision, 24 COLO. LAw. 2577 (1995).
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Colorado. Donors of conservation easements receive substantial tax
advantages from irrevocable dedications of real property for
Additionally, conservation organizations
conservation purposes.
benefit by obtaining property below market value. The public benefits
from the protection of natural values by private and non-profit sectors.
Although Colorado courts have not addressed conservation
easements on water, this article advances the premise that such
easements are valid under the state's common law. A conservation
easement statute does exist in Colorado, however it does not explicitly
cover water rights. While the Colorado Supreme Court is likely to
uphold a conservation easement on water associated with land, an
amendment is probably necessary to extend the reach of the statute to
include a conservation easement on water rights alone.
Recommendations in this paper explain how to structure a common
law conservation easement on water to enhance its legality.
H. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Analysis of conservation easements in Colorado invokes both the
common law and state statutes, which are discussed in turn.
A. WATER RIGHTS ARE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COLORADO
Only if water rights are property rights will conservation easements
bind successors in interest to meet the goal of permanence; this is the
logical starting place for the inquiry. Early on, Colorado established
that water rights created by appropriation are property rights.3
"Under the Colorado Constitution, the water of every natural
stream within the state is the property of the public, and is dedicated
to the use of the people subject to appropriation."' The Colorado
Supreme Court recently elaborated: "[t]he property right we
recognize as a Colorado water right is a right to use beneficially a
specified amount of water.... that can be captured, possessed, and
controlled in priority under a decree, to the exclusion of all others not
then in priority under a decreed water right." 5

2. The littoral level is the elevation of a standing body of water, such as a lake or
reservoir. As used hereafter, instream flow(s) refers to both water flowing in a natural
stream channel and water retained in a natural lake or artificial reservoir.
3. See Three Bells Ranch Assocs. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n, 758 P.2d
164, 169 (Colo. 1988); see also Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson,
990 P.2d 46, 58 (Colo. 1999) (citing Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, 39
(Colo. 1997)). Conditional water rights are also vested property rights. Purgatoire
River Water Conservancy Dist. v. Witte, 859 P.2d 825, 834 (Colo. 1993).
4. Shirola v. Turkey Cafion Ranch, L.L.C., 937 P.2d 739, 747-48 (Colo. 1997)
(citing COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5). The Court went on to say, "a water right is
usufructuary in nature because it gives its holder the right to use and enjoy the
property of another [the public]." Id,at 748. Interestingly, this description of a water
right sounds like a servitude because of its reference to the right "to use and enjoy" the
property of another.
5. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, 990 P.2d at 53; see also COLO. REv.
STAT. § 37-92-103(12) (2001).
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This description encompasses many of the core concepts of
property rights in general, that is, the rights to possess, to use, and to
exclude others. For water, the right to use and the right to possess are
closely related. The owner of a water right generally takes physical
possession of the water upon diversion from the stream for essentially
immediate use. In contrast, a landowner may possess a parcel of land
but never put it to any use. Unlike land, water rights are lost by non6
user.
In Colorado, a water right is a separate property interest from the
land on which it is used.7 Water rights can be, and routinely are,
conveyed independently of land. Since water rights are real property,8
water rights are treated as real property for purposes of conveyance.
The conveyance of a water right logically should carry the same types
of legal restrictions as the conveyance of land.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT AND REQUIREMENTS OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS GENERALLY

Servitudes are a confusing and difficult area of property law for
several reasons."
First, the few reported court decisions often
misname or mis-characterize the various forms of servitudes." In
addition, practicing professionals and scholars often disagree as to the
characterization of servitudes and corresponding requirements for
enforcement. 2
A general review of the development and
requirements of traditional servitudes on land is the necessary starting

6. However, the owner of a water storage right may take possession of water for
use the next year and not actually use it, if for example, natural precipitation is
sufficient to meet needs.
7. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Twin Lakes Assocs., 770 P.2d
1231, 1239 (Colo. 1989).
8. See Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, 990 P.2d at 53.
9. See Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1982); see also COLO.
REv. STAT. § 38-30-102 (2001); First Nat'l Bank v. Hastings, 42 P. 691 (Colo. Ct. App.
1895).
10.
The law in this area is an unspeakable quagmire. The intrepid soul who
ventures into this formidable wilderness never emerges unscarred. Some, the
smarter ones, quickly turn back to take up something easier like the income
taxation of trusts and estates. Others, having lost their way, plunge on and
after weeks of effort emerge not far from where they began, clearly the worse
for wear. On looking back they see the trail they thought they broke
obscured with foul smelling waters and noxious weeds. Few willingly take up
the challenge again.
Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S.
CAL.

L. REV. 1261, 1261 n.1I (1982).

11. "Since the first English case interpreting the first English statute on the subject,
commentators have doubted that the courts understood the law, and a study of
judicial opinions, from Spencer's Case on, is bewildering at best." Id.
12. For a useful and comprehensive discussion of the various characteristics and
requirements applicable to easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes, see
generally id. Professor French was subsequently chosen as the reporter for the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, where her views have been extremely
influential and upon the American Law Institute. See discussion infra pp. 15-16.
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point for an analysis of conservation servitudes.
Servitudes (encompassing easements, real covenants, and
equitable servitudes) establish private arrangements for the use of land
enforceable not only between the original parties but also against
successors in interest. The owner of a servitude has the right to use
or restrict the use of property that she neither owns nor possesses.14
The progerty that is subject to a servitude is said to be burdened, or
The right granted is the benefit. 6 When the benefit is
servient.
associated with other property, that property is characterized as
benefited, dominant, or appurtenant. 7 When the servitude does not
benefit other property, the benefit is held "in gross. " " A negative
servitude restricts the use of the burdened property, whereas a positive
servitude obligates the owner of the burdened property to perform
certain acts. 9
The two types of servitudes that are particularly relevant in the
context of water are real covenants and equitable servitudes. Real
covenants can be traced back to Spencer's Case in 1583, where English
common law permitted enforcement at law, the granting of damages,
of covenants by and against successor owners.20 Real covenants are
promises respecting land, often expressed in a deed, and usually
involving affirmative obligations.2 ' A common example is a subdivision
covenant requiring homeowners to maintain landscaping.
Generally, a real covenant must meet five requirements. First, the
covenant must be in writing, as required under the Statute of Frauds. 2
Second, the parties must intend that the covenant should run to
successors. 3 Third, the covenant must touch and concern the land. 4
Fourth, privity of estate between the original parties must exist. 25 Fifth,
the covenant must provide notice to property owners against whom
the terms of the covenant might be enforced. 6 Real covenants are
essentially a matter of contract theory, the main issue being

13. SeeFrench, supra note 10, at 1261-64.
14. See, e.g., Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Colo.
1998).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIvATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL
COVENANTS, AND EQurrABLE SERvrrUDES 253 (1990). See also discussion infra pp. 13-15
concerning the distinction between personal benefits and benefits in gross.
19. KONGOLD, supra note 18, at 253.
20. Id. at 249 (citing Spencer's Case, 5 Co. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (KB 1583)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 250. This may not be a requirement in Colorado, however, see Thornton
v. Schobe, 243 P. 617 (Colo. 1925) discussed infra note 71.
23. KORNGOLD, supra note 18, at 250. See also Cloud v. Ass'n. of Owners, Satellite
Apartment Bldg., 857 P.2d 435, 440 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
24. KORNGOLD,supra note 18, at 250. See also Cloud, 857 P.2d at 440.
25. KORNGOLD, supra note 18, at 250-51. See also Farmers' High Line Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. N.H. Real Estate Co., 92 P. 290, 293 (Colo. 1907).
26. KoRNGoLD, supra note 18, at 251.
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enforcement of promises against subsequent property owners.27
Damages are the only remedy for breach of a real covenant."
Equitable servitudes are a creation of English common law,
emanating from Tulk v. Moxhay.! Like real covenants, equitable
servitudes are "'promises respecting the use of land''"'0 An equitable
servitude usually grants a right to restrict the use of property one
neither owns nor possesses, which explains why they are also known
as negative easements. However, under modern American law,
equitable servitudes also may impose affirmative burdens on servient
properties."2
Conservation easements on real property are equitable servitudes.
Like a real covenant, an equitable servitude is enforceable not only
betqveen the original parties, but also against successors in interest. 3
Enforceability of an equitable servitude generally turns on satisfaction
of three requirements:" (1) the equitable servitude must show intent
to bind successors;" (2) it must touch and concern the property;3 6 and
(3) property owners must have notice that the servitude may be
enforced against them. 7 In contrast to real covenants, equitable
servitudes are enforceable in equity. Thus, an injunction is the
38
remedy for breach of an equitable servitude, rather than damages.
Equitable servitudes are understood not as contract rights, but rather
as a property interest appurtenant to the benefited land and
enforceable against the burdened parcel. 9 Since the right exists in the
land itself, privity and a writing are not required. 0
In summary, there are two principal differences between real
covenants and equitable servitudes. First, real covenants are usually
affirmative obligations, whereas equitable servitudes are most often
negative restrictions on the use of property. Second, although real
covenants are enforced through damages, equitable servitudes are
enforced through injunctions.
A "conservation" servitude is well

27. Id. at 250.
28. Id. at 249-50.
29. Id. (citing Tulk v Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (CA 1848)).
30. Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the
Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements,63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 437 (1984).
31. French, supra note 10, at 1276.
32. Id. at 1277.
33. SeeKORNGOLD, supranote 18, at 249-51.
34. Id. at 251.
35. Id. at 250-51.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. KORNGOLD, supranote 18, at 250.
39. Id. at251.
40. Id. at 251-52.
41. While the discussion emphasizes the usual distinctions between real covenants
and equitable servitudes for explanation, one can find examples of either that look
like the other, i.e., are called one thing but better meet the definition of the other.
There are, in short, no immutable rules. See discussion infra notes 148, 149, 155 and
accompanying text.
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suited to protect conservation values because it is enforceable with an
injunction. The threat of damages for violation of a real covenant,
however, imposes an additional enforcement incentive due to the
difficulty and substantial cost of replacing damaged conservation
values.4
C. COMMON LAW CONSERVATION SERVITUDES

In the few recent American "cases involving conservation
[easements].... courts have not hesitated to enforce them."43
However, a special enforcement problem exists when the benefit is in
gross because the common law historically disfavored both easements
Consequently, courts did not
in gross and negative easements."
Since the benefit of a
enforce negative easements in gross.45
conservation easement is usually held in gross, doubts about legitimacy
may arise. Although at least one court has upheld common law
conservation easements in gross,46 their efficacy is not entirely clear.
Judge Clark,47 in his famous treatise on interests "running with
land," observed that modem servitudes rest on the equitable doctrine
of notice.4" The two most developed theories of enforcement are
through contracts concerning land and through servitudes on land.4
These theories correspond respectively to the modern classification of
real covenants and equitable servitudes.
The contract theory asserts that a restriction is specifically enforced
against both the promissor and those who take from the promissor
with notice." The promissee and those who take from her may also

42. In a typical conservation easement, the parties inventory the conservation
values at the time they create the easement. For example, an inventory might include
ten acres of wetlands. If the grantor subsequently dries up the wetlands, the grantee
could sue for the replacement cost of the lost conservation value, including the loss of
scenic, aesthetic, and environmental values.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 8.5 rep. note (2000) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (citing Harris v. Pease, 66 A.2d 590 (Conn. 1949) (restrictive
covenant against erection of buildings on part of land conveyed); Sagalyn v. Found.
for Historic Pres. of Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107 (D.C. 1997) (deed of scenic, open
space, and architectural facade easement); Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic
Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994) (enforcement of historic preservation
easement agreement held in gross by a private non-profit corporation)).
44. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and PrivateMagic in the Law of Land Trusts and
ConservationEasements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077,
1080-81 (1996); see also CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS
WHICH "RUN WITH LAND:" INCLUDING LICENSES,
RESTRICTIONS AND RENTS 70, 181 (2d ed. 1947).

EASEMENTS,

PROFITS,

EQUITABLE

45. See Korngold, supra note 30, at 470-71. Korngold notes "[tihese opinions are
troubling for their lack of a clear rationale...." Id. at 471.
46. See supranote 43.
47. Judge Clark served as a Judge for the 2nd Circuit in 1939, and as Chief Judge
on the United States Court of Appeals from 1954-59.
48. CLARK, supranote 44, at 170.
49. Id. at 171.
50. Id. at 172.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 5

enforce the obligation." Judge Clark criticized the contract theory on
several grounds. Most notably, the contract approach may fail "to
benefit the persons whose interests actually should be protected" and
could potentially give a right where none exists.52 The contract theory
focuses on the personal nature of the interest, although the purpose
may not actually be personal." Such an interpretation limits the
restriction to the promissor, thus negating the promissee's benefit
when the property is transferred.54 In addition, the doctrine of
changed circumstances could render a restriction unenforceable,
effectively giving others the power to overturn the restriction.55
Thompson on Real Property ("Thompson"), a leading treatise, continues to
cite Judge Clark's concern that contract remedies may not protect
56
servitudes in gross "unless property interests are directly threatened."
Still, there are recent American decisions that enforce property
restrictions solely on contract theory.57
In following the property theory, English courts historically did not
American courts,
allow enforcement of benefits held in gross."
however, departed from England with the famous 1913 Illinois case of
Van Sant v. Rose." In Van Sant, the deed provided for construction of a
When the
single private house only, not a flat or a tenement."
landowner began plans to build an apartment house, the sellers
invoked the covenant and sued to enjoin the construction."' The
landowner argued that the restriction was unenforceable because the
sellers did not own other property affected by the breach.62 The
Illinois Supreme Court held that the right to an in unction did not
depend upon whether the covenantee was damaged. The Court also
held that the sellers' right did not depend upon owning property in
the vicinity. 6' Van Sant is cited for the proposition that benefits held in
gross are enforceable.65 Judge Clark subsequently argued, "the benefit
should be allowed to remain in gross while the burden passes with a
servient estate. This is in accord with the American attitude toward
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 174.
CLARK, supra note 44, at 177.
Id. at 174.

55.

Id.

56.
1994)
57.
(D.C.
(D.C.

7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION 516 (David A. Thomas ed.,
[hereinafter THOMPSON] (citing CLARK, supra note 44, at 181).
See, e.g., Bagley v. Found. for the Pres. of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110
1994); see also Sagalyn v. Found. for Historic Pres. of Georgetown, 691 A.2d 107
1997).

58. See CLARK, supra note 44, at 181.
59. Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194 (Ill. 1913).

60. Id. at 195.
61. I
62. Id.
63. Id. at 196.
64. Van Sant, 103 N.E. at 196.
65. See, e.g., KORNGOLD, supra note 18, at 337. Van Sant has not been cited in
Colorado.
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easements in gross and also covenants in gross.,,66
D. CONSERVATION SERVITUDES UNDER COLORADO COMMON LAW

Consistent with the traditional view of negative easements, in 1953,
the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "in construing a building
restriction [in a deed], all doubts must be resolved against the
restriction and in favor of free and unrestricted use of property." 67

However, the Court subsequently commented that, "[t]his rule may or
may not today have the sanctity that it has possessed in the past. In any
event, it has no application when the language is definite in its terms.

One must follow the dictates of plain English."" Thus, a carefully
crafted conservation easement that benefits appurtenant land should
be enforceable in Colorado in the same manner as other servitudes. 69
The enforceability of a common law servitude in gross is an
unsettled question in Colorado, as in most states.7 A servitude on a
water right is enforced, if at all, on a property theory, like other
servitudes. 1

While no

decisions addressing the enforceability of

66. CLARX, supranote 44, at 182 (citations omitted).
67. Flaks v. Wichman, 260 P.2d 737, 739 (Colo. 1953).
68. D.C. Burns Realty & Trust Co. v. Mack, 450 P.2d 75, 76 (Colo. 1969) (citing 20
AM. JUR. Evidence § 897 (1939)).
69. See infra note 122.
70. See infra note 108.
71. The alternative is that the Colorado Supreme Court would find that restrictions
on the use of water are contract rights. There is some authority for this position. In
Thornton v. Schobe, 243 P. 617 (Colo. 1925), the issue was whether an oral promise
restricting the use of land was void under the statute of frauds. The court held that an
agreement not to erect certain structures "is not a transfer of an estate or interest
therein nor a trust or power over it" and is not subject to the statute of frauds. Id. at
618. But see Nelson v. Farr, 354 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1960). The court was asked to decide
whether to extend deed restrictions on the use of land to an adjacent parcel. Id. at
165. The parcel at issue was withheld from a plat and annexation deed that restricted
the use of the land to unattached single-family dwellings. Id. at 164. The court noted
the lack of a written instrument and contrary testimony of the subdivider regarding his
intent. Id. at 165-66. The court held that the restrictive covenants did not apply to the
disputed property. Id See also Smith v. Clifton Sanitation Dist., 300 P.2d 548 (Colo.
1956), where the district sought to exercise its power of eminent domain to acquire a
tract of land for a sanitary disposal system. On the eve of the condemnation, the
owner of the tract entered into a restrictive use agreement with thirty-seven adjacent
landowners in an eleven square mile area in an attempt to defeat the district's plans.
Id. at 549. The issue was simply whether the covenanters should be permitted to
intervene and recover damages because of the district's condemnation. Id. The court
opined that the scheme was contrary to public policy and "invalid as against the
constitutional and statutory rights of the condemner." Id. In dicta, the court stated
the covenant was an attempt to enforce "what in effect are contractual rights." Id. The
court characterized the agreement as "in the nature of a negative easement or
equitable servitude" that was probably "enforceable in equity as between the parties to
the contract." Id. at 550. The Court then stated "[p]arties may not by contract...
restrict the exercise of the power of eminent domain" (citations omitted). Id. This
case narrowly holds that, at least under these circumstances, the court will not rule
that a condemner pay for mere contract rights. Clifton has only, and infrequently,
been cited in eminent domain cases, and never by a Colorado court. See, e.g., Direct
Mail Servs., Inc. v. Best, 729 F.2d 672, 676 (10th Cir. 1984); Gremillion v. Rapides
Parish Sch. Bd., 134 So. 2d 700, 702 (La. Ct. App. 1961). Secondary sources treat
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servitudes in gross exist in Colorado, 72 the Courts have a variety of
authoritative sources to consult. The most persuasive authority is
discussed below.
Colorado courts usually turn to Thompson73 when confronted with
questions on easements, real covenants, and servitudes. 4 Thompson
notes that servitudes in gross present two kinds of problems:" (1) the
benefit is held in gross while the burden purportedly binds
successors; 6 and (2) attempts to assign the benefit raise further

Clion as an eminent domain case. See, e.g., 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 4, 19,
175 (1996). Others have similarly characterized Clifton as an eminent domain case.
See, e.g., Case Note, Eminent Domain - CompensationforNeighboringLandownersfor
Taking
of Land for Use Inconsistent with Restrictive Covenantfor Their Benefit, 26 FoRDHAM L. REV.
130 (1958). Schobe and Clifton provide the only authority for the proposition that
Colorado has adopted the contract approach to the enforcement of servitudes. In
contrast, there are numerous Colorado appellate decisions that apply the property
theory of the enforcement to servitudes. See, e.g., infra note 74. The Colorado
Supreme Court, however, has followed principles of contract law in determining
whether a deed is ambiguous. O'Brien v. Village Land Co., 794 P.2d 246, 249 (Colo.
1990) (extrinsic evidence conditionally admitted to determine ambiguity). The Court
then reaffirmed that approach in the context of a servitude contained in a deed. Lazy
Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229 (Colo. 1998) "[B]oth the O'Brien
approach and the Restatement [Third] approach allow a court to consider extrinsic
evidence to arrive at the meaning of a servitude's language." Id. at 1237.
72. But cf.Steven M. Hoffman, Note, Open Space Procurement Under Colorado's Scenic
Easement Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 383, 395 (1989) (citing Upper Eagle Valley
Sanitation Dist. v. Carnie, 634 P.2d 1008 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)). In Carnie, the Court
of Appeals upheld the award in a condemnation action for an easement for a
previously installed sewer line. The sanitation district argued that it had already
acquired an easement. Id.at 1009-10. The Court estopped the district from
furthering this assertion, but said in dicta that, "where the land is thus already
burdened by such an easement when a purchaser acquires title, he takes that land in
that condition when he acquires title." Id. at 1009 (citing Rogers v. Lower Clear Creek
Ditch Co., 165 P. 248 (Colo. 1917)). The issue in Rogers, as in Carnie, was the
subsequent landowner's right to compensation for previously existing conditions.
Rogers, 165 P. at 249.
73. THOMPSON, supra note 56.
74. A Westlaw search retrieved fourteen Colorado Supreme Court servitudes cases
quoting Thompson twice as many as any other source. The search terms were
"Thompson /2 Real /1 Property /P Easement Servitude Covenant," searched Oct. 13,
2001. See, e.g., Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1236, 1238
(Colo. 1998); Salazar v. Terry, 911 P.2d 1086, 1091-92 (Colo. 1996). Similar Westlaw
searches identified seven cases that cited the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (1944) and
one that cited the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43. See discussion infra notes 99105. Only three cases in this series failed to also cite Thompson. Three Colorado
Supreme Court cases quoted RIcHARD ROY BELDEN POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
(2000), a majority of which also cited THOMPSON, supra note 56. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Whinnery, 895 P.2d 537, 540 (Colo. 1995); Isenberg v. Woitchek, 356 P.2d 904, 907
(Colo. 1960). Similarly, one case cited HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY (3d ed. 1995) and THOMPSON, supra note 56. Lazy Dog Ranch, 965 P.2d at
1238.

Two cases cited AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

PROPERTY INTHE UNITED STATES (A. James Casner ed., 1952), one of which also cited
THOMPSON, supra note 56. See Upper Harmony Ditch Co. v. Carwin, 539 P.2d 1282,
1285 (Colo. 1975). The author found no cites to ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ETAL., THE
LAW OF PROPERTY (1993). Decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals follow a similar
pattern. (Search results on file with author.)
75. THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 516.
76. Id.
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questions of enforcement." Moreover, the creation of a servitude in
gross may not meet some formulations of the requirement that a
servitude "touch and concern" the property for the burden to run."
Servitudes in gross also may not be enforceable unless they directly
threaten property interests.]
Thompson reviews the policy reasons against servitudes in gross
identified by Professor French,"0 who served as Reporter for the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes ("Restatement (Third)")."l One
such reason is the enhanced notice provided by an appurtenance
requirement when there is not a fully developed recording system."
Professor French observed that effective recording systems, such as
exist in the United States, allow for the discovery of a servitude in gross
even though the current owner may not be on record. "' Another
policy argument against servitudes in gross is that the holder of a
benefit in gross may obstruct a landowner seeking relief from an
obsolete servitude. Conversely, an appurtenant landowner is likely to
benefit from, and agree to, the change.
Thompson also illustrates the advantages of servitudes in gross,
particularly for conservation easements.
Without conservation
easements in gross, acquisition or retention of anchor parcels would
be necessary
However, Thompson recognizes that combining the
servitude with additional interests, for example a small benefited
anchor parcel, 7 can finesse the legitimacy of servitudes in gross.88
Thompson concludes, "guidance may be found in the fact that 'benefits
in gross are freely permitted'" by the Restatement (Third)."8 Thus,
Colorado courts following the advice in Thompson would uphold a
common law conservation easement in gross.
Colorado courts have occasionally followed the Restatement (First)of
Propert90 ("Restatement") when confronted with questions on
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Professor of Law, UCLA; A.B. 1964 Stanford University;J.D. 1967, University of
Washington.
81. THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 516 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, §

2.6).

82. Id.
83. Id. (citing French, supranote 10, at 1287 n.142).
84. Id. at 516-17 (citing French, supra note 10, at 1287).
85. Id. at 517 (citing Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of
Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 928, 945-47
(1988)).
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 2.6 reporter's note (1998).
87. For example, a water right might be tied to the land on which it was historically
used to preserve agricultural, wildlife habitat, wetlands, or other water-dependant
natural values. One could anchor an instream flow right to a parcel of the streambed
or riparian land that realized environmental benefits from the flow, such as an
enhanced fishery.
88.

THOMPSON, supra note 56, at 517.

89. Id.
90. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. (1944) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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easements. 9' The Restatement speaks to the alienability of easements in
gross, which are alienable if commercial." A commercial easement in
gross results primarily in economic benefits rather than personal
satisfaction." Most jurisdictions allow the assignment of an easement
in gross if it is created for a commercial purpose.9 4
Noncommercial easements are those in which the use inures
primarily to the personal satisfaction of the owner. 95 One could argue
that simply because water rights have a clear economic value, an
easement in gross on water should meet the Restatement test for
alienability. Agricultural land, for example, has greater economic
productivity when irrigated. Thus, a conservation easement dedicating
a water right to continued agricultural use would be commercial and
alienable under the Restatement. In contrast, an instream flow held for
environmental purposes arguably provides personal satisfaction rather
than economic benefit, and thus may not be alienable under the
Restatement.
The Restatement (Third) sheds some further light on the crucial
commercial/personal distinction. The Restatement (Third) distinguishes
between personal and in gross benefits, but the categories are not
mutually exclusive.96 The enjoyment of personal benefits is limited to
the beneficiary and the beneficiary's immediate circle of family and
friends.
Benefits in gross "can be enjoyed without regard to the
beneficiary's ownership or occupancy of any other interest. " "'
Applying this distinction, if a conservation easement is structured to
maintain instream flows, the benefit extends beyond the grantee's
immediate circle of family and friends because others enjoy enhanced
downstream environmental, recreational and/or aesthetic values.
Instream flows may also benefit commercial rafting and guided fishing,
resulting in an indirect economic benefit. On balance, a conservation
easement on water is easily classified as non-personal, and therefore
commercial. Thus, Colorado courts would find that an easement in
gross on a water right is alienable under the Restatement if they followed
the distinction of the Restatement (Third). Moreover, it would be
pointless to affirm alienability without also making such an easement
enforceable.
Colorado courts also sometimes follow the Restatement (Third) with
91. See, e.g., Salazar v. Terry, 911 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Colo. 1996); Thompson v.
Whinnery, 895 P.2d 537, 540-42 (Colo. 1995).
92. REsTATEMENT, supra note 90, § 489.
93. Id. § 489 cmt. c. Classification as "commercial or noncommercial depends
upon whether the element of economic benefit or personal satisfaction
predominates." Id.
94. Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, ConservationEasements and the Common Law, 8
STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 2, 14, (1989) (citing French, supra note 10, at 1268).
95. RESTATEMENT, supra note 90, § 491 cmt. a; see id. § 492. In Westland Nursing
Home, Inc. v. Benson, 517 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974), the Court of Appeals
implied in dicta that a personal easement is not enforceable against a successor.
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 2.6 cmt. c.
97. 1&
98. Id.
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regard to easements."
The Restatement (Third) produced a
"substantially simplified doctrinal structure that requires only intent
and compliance with the Statute of Frauds to create express servitudes
and treats all servitudes as valid, except those which are illegal or
violate public policy."0 0 The essential point is, "the intent of the parties
to create servitude benefits in others should be given effect,"
regardless of whether they are appurtenant to a benefited estate or
held in gross.'0 ' The Restatement (Third) imposes "no limits on the kinds
or combinations of servitude benefits that can be created.""' It clearly
states that one may hold the benefits of negative covenants in gross,
and uses a common law conservation easement to illustrate that
point."' The Restatement (Third) Reporter concludes that governmental
bodies should possess the ability to enforce conservation easements in
gross imposed for their benefit. 05
While the common law does not resolve all doubts, 6 Colorado
courts usually follow the authorities that uniformly support
enforcement of negative servitudes in gross, such as conservation
easements.' °7 Many states, including Colorado, authorize conservation
99. See, e.g., Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp, 965 P.2d 1229, 1235, 1237-38
(Colo. 1998).
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1993). One
possible public policy concern is implicit in the doctrine of maximum utilization of
water announced in Fellhauerv. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1968). See also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (2001). The Colorado Supreme Court, however, has only
applied the doctrine within the state's water law, i.e., the appropriation, diversion, and
use of water rights. See Application for Water Rights of Hines Highlands Ltd. P'ship,
929 P.2d 718, 724 (Colo. 1996); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1,
43 (Colo. 1996); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 962 (Colo.
1995) (the "can and will" doctrine); Consol. Home Supply Ditch & Reservoir Co. v.
Town of Berthoud, 896 P.2d 260, 271 (Colo. 1995) (abandonment); Simpson v. Yale
Investments, Inc., 886 P.2d 689, 696 (Colo. 1994); R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Ass'n of
Dist. No. 6, 690 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1984); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo.
Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 574 (Colo. 1979) ( in-stream appropriation
without diversion); A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57, 69 (Colo. 1978)
(reasonable means of diversion); Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 550 P.2d 297, 304 (Colo. 1976) (plans of augmentation); Kuiper v.
Lundvall, 529 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Colo. 1974); Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo. 1974) (saved water); Hall v.
Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329, 332 (Colo. 1973) (tributary groundwater).
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 2.6 cmt. b.
102. Id. cmt. c.
103. Id. cmt. d.
104. Id. cmt. d, illus. 2.
105. Id. reporter's note. The Reporter did not comment on enforcement by nongovernmental parties.
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 43, § 2.6, reporter's note.
107. In 1976, Glenn Tiedt advanced a statutory construction argument for
conservation easements in gross. He reasoned that statutory references to easements
as interests in land and water implied a general recognition of conservation easements
as fully enforceable interests in land and water in Colorado, but that this was
insufficient for estate and tax planning purposes.
Glenn F. Tiedt, Conservation
Easements in Colorado, 5 COLO. LAw 1265, 1265-66 (1976). For example, the Board of
Parks and Recreation was authorized to:
[a] cquire by gift, transfer, lease, purchase, or long-term operating agreement
such land and water, or interest in land and water, as the director ...deems
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easements in 5 ross by statute to remove any question about their
enforceability.'
E. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS UNDER THE COLORADO STATUTE
Colorado has enacted a statute specifically authorizing
conservation easements in gross.' 9 The legislation created a powerful
and effective tax and estate planning tool for Colorado landowners."'
Before the legislation was enacted, few people were willing to take the
risk that the Internal Revenue Service would disallow a charitable
contribution of a conservation easement for federal income tax
purposes, or ignore it when valuing property for federal estate taxes."'
The Colorado statute provides:
"Conservation easement in gross," for the purposes of this article,
means a right in the owner of the easement to prohibit or require a
limitation upon or an obligation to perform acts on or with respect to
a land or water area or airspace above the land or water owned by the
grantor appropriate to the retaining or maintaining of such land,
water, or airspace, including improvements, predominantly in a
natural, scenic, or open condition, or for wildlife habitat, or for
agricultural, horticultural, recreational, forest, or other use or
condition consistent with the protection of open land having
wholesome environmental quality or life-sustaining ecological
diversity, or appropriate to the conservation and preservation of
buildings, sites, or structures having historical, architectural, or
cultural interest or value (emphasis added).
The statute expressly authorizes "a limitation upon or an obligation to
perform acts on or with respect to a land... or water owned by the
grantor appropriate to the retaining or maintaining of such land...
for agricultural, horticultural, recreational, forest, or other use..."113
The language strongly supports the notion that the statute authorizes
limitations or obligations on water rights designed to ensure the
continued use of those rights under a conservation easement on land
for irrigation or other purposes.
The typical language in a
conservation easement that requires the grantor to retain water rights
necessary for agricultural production"4 and to continue irrigation falls
necessary, suitable, or proper for parks or outdoor recreation purposes or for
the preservation or conservation of sites, scenes, open space, and vistas of
public interest.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-30-105(1)(a) (1973). The term "interest in land and water" is
defined to include easements. COLO.REv. STAT. § 33-10-107(1) (a) (2001).
108.

109.
STAT.
110.
111.
112.

RESTATEMENT (THiRD), supra note 43, § 8.5 cmt. a.

Act of May 13, 1976, ch. 153, 1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 750 (codified at COLO. REv.
§§ 38-30.5-101 to 111 (2001)).
Tiedt, supra note 107, at 1267.
Id. at 1267.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (2001).

113. Id.
114. Deed of Conservation Easement (Mesa Ranch) at 4, (appears of record in the
office of the Delta County Clerk and Recorder under Reception No. 501406).
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within this authority. Whether the statute authorizes limitations or
obligations on water rights in any other context is a more difficult
issue, that Colorado courts have yet to address.
The definition of "conservation easement in gross" uses the terms
"water area" and "water," but does not refer to the term "water
right."".
The question thus arises as to whether the statute is
independently applicable to water rights. No reported Colorado case
on this issue exists.
When construing a statute, the Colorado Supreme Court first looks
to its plain language."1 6 At first blush, the Court would probably
conclude that the Colorado General Assembly understood the term
"water right" very well, and if the legislature intended to include water
rights it would have used that term. It is possible, however, that the
Court would find the terms "water area" and "water" ambiguous. If a
statute is ambiguous, the Supreme Court considers indicia of
legislative intent, such as the "'object sought to be attained'," the
"'legislative history'," and the "'consequences of a particular
construction'. " "
The question of legislative intent is problematic. The legislation
began as an open space bill," 8 and grew to include the "conservation
and preservation of buildings, sites, or structures having historical,
architectural or cultural interest or value."" 9 The legislative goal was
apparently limited to validating conservation easements in gross 20 on
open space land and historic structures, since the General Assembly
believed appurtenant servitudes were valid under the common law.1
The express legislative intent provides:
The general assembly finds and declares that it is in the public
interest to define conservation easements in gross, since such
easements have not been defined by the judiciary. Further, the
115. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (2001).
116.

City of Westminster v. Dogan Constr. Co., 930 P.2d 585, 590 (Colo. 1997).

117. Id. (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-203(1)(a), (c), (e) (1980)). The current
statute is unchanged. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 2-4-203(1)(a), (c), (e) (2001).
118.

Hearing on S.B. 59 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess.

(Colo. Mar. 23, 1976) (statement of Lucius E. Woods, Esq., Holme, Roberts & Owen,
drafter of the original legislation for Senator Schieffelin).
119. COLO. HOtJSEJOURNAL 857 (Mar. 25, 1976).
120. The legislative view that conservation easements in gross were not valid appears
traceable to a widely circulated and discussed article citing the AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY. See TRUST DEPARTMENT, THE BANK OF CALIFORNIA (San Francisco, Cal.), Tax
Planningfor Everyman's Future: The ConservationEasement, ESTATE PLANNING STUDIES, 3
(Spring 1972) (citing 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 8.12 (1952) ("a negative
easement is always an appurtenant easement") (attached to Legislative Council, Staff
Summary of Meeting, House Committee on Judiciary (Mar. 16, 1976))). Notably, the
Colorado Supreme Court has rarely relied on the AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
preferring instead other treatises that, in contrast, endorse the enforcement of
negative easements in gross. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 56.
121. Hearing on S.B. 59 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Colo. Mar. 23, 1976) (statement of Chairman Jerry Kopel). Rep. Kopel, an attorney,
stated that a conservation easement that is appurtenant is permissible under existing
case law. Id.
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general assembly finds and declares that it is in the public interest to
determine who may receive such
•
122 easements and for what purposes
such easements may be received.
The legislature did not discuss conservation easements on water rights
not associated with land, although some conflicting and ambiguous
23
expressions regarding water rights in the legislative history do exist.
The statute, however, expressly provides that "[n]o provision of this
article shall be construed to mean that conservation easements in gross
were not lawful estates in land prior to July 1, 1976." (emphasis
added) 2 4 This implies that the statute addressed only land and not
other property interests, such as water rights, raising another
complication. The legislature was aware of existing conservation
easements on historic properties,2 and expanded the legislation to
cover them. 6 Surely, the legislature did not intend to simultaneously
nullify existing conservation easements on historic property. This
conclusion is consistent with other statutory language in the savings
clause that "[n]o interest in real property cognizable under the
statutes, common law, or custom in effect in [Colorado] prior to July
1, 1976... shall be impaired, invalidated
or in any way adversely
27
affected" by enactment of the statute.
Additional confusion stems from language that excludes the
transfer or change in a point of diversion of a water right.28 This
language was added to clarify that the statute did not impair the
transfer or change in the point of diversion of a water right.'2 The
amendment implies that the legislature did not want to preclude
changes in water rights, whether authorized before or after the passage
of the conservation easement statute. It is unclear whether this is a
case of extra caution, or a suggestion that the legislature thought the

122. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-101 (2001).
123. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 59 Before the Senate State Affairs Comm., 50th Legis., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Colo. Feb. 4, 1976). The following exchange took place at 10:50:26 a.m.:
Senator Schieffelin (principal sponsor): "I do have a statement here, two

documents for your file if you care to look at them. One is the effect of this

bill on water rights, which I think one of you, somebody, asked, I don't know
if it was Senator Kinney or Senator Noble, or who, and you can see the last

statement on that: 'In short, S.B. 59 could not be used to lock up the state's
valuable resources."' (The statement is attributed to Glenn Porzak, a water

attorney then practicing with Holme, Roberts & Owen).
Senator Noble (Committee Chairman): "Just one man's opinion, not sure I
agree with it."
124. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-110 (2001).
125. Hearing on S.B. 59 Before Senate State Affairs Comm., 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Colo. Feb. 4, 1976) (statement ofJames Bull, Esq., attorney for Historic Denver). Mr.
Bull testified that there were seven historic preservation conservation easements in

gross created in Denver in the preceding three years. Id.
126.
127.

COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-104(4) (2001).
Id. § 38-30.5-110.

128. "[N] or any transfer of a water right or any change of a point of diversion at any
time.. ." Id. § 38-30.5-110.
129. Debate on S.B. 59 in the Senate, 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. Mar. 8, 1976)
(statement of Senator Fred Anderson).
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bill encompassed water rights. In this context, the former is more
likely.
Absent a clear expression of legislative intent, 3 ' the consequences
of a particular construction become especially important. Most
Colorado attorneys practicing in the area of conservation easements
believe that Colorado's statute covers water rights used on land
covered by a statutory conservation easement.'31 There are probably
$50 million worth of water rights included in such easements in the
state. 32
The13 Internal Revenue Service13 recognizes these
encumbrances, as does the State of Colorado.
IRS recognition is
crucial, since income and inheritance tax benefits provide the
financial incentive to donate conservation easements. An additional
incentive, the Colorado income tax credit, became available on
.January 1, 2000.13' Few donors would create conservation easements
without such monetary benefits.
In order to meet deduction
requirements prescribed by the Internal Revenue Code, it may be
necessary to include the valuation of water rights in a conservation
easement on land.'3 6 For example, irrigated land without water rights
is essentially dry land, and thus entitled to a deduction only for the
lesser value of dry land.
Another aspect producing conflicting interpretations of the issue
at hand is the effect of the Colorado statute on common law
conservation easements. Some believe that while "it may have been
possible to create valid conservation easements under the common law
prior to enactment of article 30.5, Colorado's conservation easement
130. Although not admissible in court, the bill's sponsor, (former) Senator Joe
Schieffelin, and the legislature's reigning water expert at the time and bill co-sponsor,
(former) Senate President Fred Anderson, told the author that there was no intention
to allow conservation easements on water alone and that was the reason for using
indefinite terms. Telephone Interview with (former) Senator Joe Schieffelin and
(former) Senate President Fred Anderson (Sept. 19, 1999).
131. Interview with David L. Kuosman, Esq., Conservation Practice Group, Isaacson,
Rosenbaum, Woods & Levy, P.C., Denver, Colo. (Jan. 4, 2000). Denver University Law
Professor Federico Cheever has identified this firm as Colorado's preeminent land
trust firm. Cheever, supra note 44, at 1077; see also letter from William M. Silberstein,
Esq., Chatir, Conservation Practice Group, Isaacson, Rosenbaum, Woods & Levy, P.C.,
to Robert F. Wigington, Esq., The Nature Conservancy (Sept. 19, 1990) (on file with
author).
1
132. Telephone Interview with William M. Silberstein, Esq., Chair, Conservation
Practice Group, Isaacson, Rosenbaum, Woods & Levy, P.C. (Oct. 12, 2001). The total
value of the water exceeds $50 million if just 10 percent of the land in Colorado
covered by a conservation easement is irrigated, assuming an average water value of
$500 per acre-foot and the statewide average delivery of 3.46 acre-feet per acre. For
acres under easement, see Land Trust Alliance, Summary Data from the National Land
Trust, http://lta.org/newsroom/census-summary-data.htm (posted Sept. 12, 2001).
For water deliveries see COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, CuMULATIVE YEARLY
STATISTICS OF THE COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES (2000).
133. See, e.g., Strasburg v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697, 1699 (2000).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-522(2) (2001).
135. See Patricia Templar Dow, The Unique Benefits of Conservation Easements in
Colorado, 30 COLO. LAw. 49, 50-1 (Dec. 2001) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-522(2)
(2001)).
136. Telephone Interview with Silberstein, supra note 132.
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law now seems to preclude this option."" 7 However, the statutory
language is susceptible to another analytic approach. Servitudes
coming within the statutory definition of "conservation easement in
gross " 138 are valid only if created in conformance with statutory

requirements;' 39 common law governs those servitudes not within the
This interpretation is consistent with the
statutory definition.
legislature's decision to address only conservation easements in gross
and not appurtenant
servitudes, which are presumptively valid under
1 40
common law.

As discussed above, landowners may create enforceable limitations
and obligations on water rights used to maintain land for agricultural
or other recognized uses. ' A statutory conservation easement is
perpetual unless the instrument creating it states otherwise.142 A
conservation easement on water rights not granted by the owners of
the land to which the water rights are appurtenant, apparently is
impermissible under the statute because such easements "may only be
created by the record owners of the surface of the land." 43 Thus, such
easements must take their chances under the common law.
Due to the number of conservation easements in existence and tax
benefits received, calamitous consequences for donors and their
attorneys would follow a Supreme Court decision excluding water
rights from conservation easements on land. Thus, it is unlikely the
Supreme Court would jeopardize existing conservation easements on
water rights associated with land. To avoid that result, the Court could
narrowly hold the statute to cover water rights contained in a
conservation easement on land where the grantor of the easement
owns the water rights, (which is common), and the easement simply
seeks continued historic use of the water rights on that land.
F. THE ACTUAL USE OF EASEMENTS ON WATER IN COLORADO

Conservation easements in Colorado routinely include provisions
restricting the use of water rights on land included in a conservation
easement.'44 Groups such as Great Outdoors Colorado, the Colorado
137. Hoffman, supra note 72, at 386 (citation omitted).
138. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (2001).
139.

Id. § 38-30.5-104.

140. Hearing on S.B. 59 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 50th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Colo. Mar. 23, 1976) (statement of Chairman Jerry Kopel). Rep. Kopel, an attorney,
stated that an appurtenant conservation easement was permissible under existing case
law. Id.
141. See discussion supra note 113.
142. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-103(3) (2001).
143. Id. § 38-30.5-104(1).
144. Interview with Kuosman, supra note 131. In a recent example, the Three Rivers
Land Trust received a conservation easement covering a ranch in Delta County. The
deed also contains a provision explicitly providing that the grantors shall retain and
reserve the water rights to maintain agricultural production and shall not transfer,
encumber, lease, sell or otherwise separate the water rights from the ranch property.
See Deed of Conservation Easement (Mesa Ranch) 4 (appears of record in the office of
the Delta County Clerk and Recorder under Reception No. 501406). The language in
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Cattlemen's Agricultural Land Trust, the Yampa Valley Land Trust,
and The Nature Conservancy, among others, use form conservation
easements that include water rights.'4
There is one particularly notorious example of a "covenant"
effectively restricting future development of conditional water rights
associated with a donation to the Colorado Water Conservation Board
("CWCB"). Only water rights were involved in the transaction; no land
was included. In 1987, the Pittsburgh & Midway Coal and Mining
Company ("P&M") donated certain conditional water rights on the
Gunnison River to The Nature Conservancy ("TNC"), who
subsequently donated the same to the CWCB. However, P&M did not
donate all of their Gunnison River conditional rights to TNC. P&M
also entered into a covenant with TNC not to develop any of its
retained water rights over a thirteen-mile stretch of the Gunnison
River, 46 which was proposed for federal designation as a Wild and
Scenic River. The agreement between P&M and TNC appears to meet
all legal requirements of either an enforceable real covenant or an
equitable servitude,
except that the benefit is in gross. The
agreement looks like a negative easement, that is, an equitable
servitude in gross, thus its enforceability under the common law is not
clear.4 4 A creative alternate analysis is that the restricted water rights
this deed closely tracks the sample conservation easement in Krendl's Colorado
practice manual. See 2 COLORADO PRACTICE, METHODS OF PRACTICE 314 (4th ed. 1998).
These examples, of course, are servitudes that are appurtenant to land and not held in
gross, thus avoiding questions of enforceability.
145. Interview with Kuosman, supra note 131.
146. AGREEMENT

FOR DONATION

AND

COVENANT

OF WATER RIGHTS:

BETWEEN

PITrSBURGH & MIDWAY COAL MINING CO. AND THE NATURE CONSERvANCY 7 (Dec. 31,
1987) (appears of record in the office of the Delta County Clerk and Recorder under
Reception No. 546353).
147. The agreement is written and therefore complies with the statute of frauds. See
id. The covenant touches and concerns the water rights because it prevents their
physical diversion or impoundment in the specified reach of the Gunnison River. Id.
at 7. The parties were in privity. The covenant was recorded; recording gives notice to
successors and assigns. Id. at 11. Both parties intended to bind their successors and
assigns. Id. at 10. However, another provision states that the covenant is "for the
benefit of TNC [The Nature Conservancy] only." Id. at 7. This provision might not
have allowed a successor to TNC's interest to enforce the covenant, although it would
still be enforceable by TNC. Memorandum from Robert Wigington, Esq., Attorney,
The Nature Conservancy, to Michael Dennis, The Nature Conservancy (Aug. 29, 1986)
(on file with author). The covenant was later amended and re-conveyed to clarify that
P&M intended it to run to TNC's successor, the CWCB. (TNC subsequently conveyed
the covenant with the water rights to the CWCB). E-mail from Robert Wigington,
Esq., Attorney, The Nature Conservancy (June 23, 2001) (on file with author).
148. There are other significant legal problems with a covenant restricting future
development of a conditional water right. A threshold issue is whether a conditional
water right restricted by a covenant against development "can and will" be perfected.
Where "circumstances regarding the continuing intent and capability to put the water
to beneficial use under the decreed appropriation may change, [a]ll or part of the
conditional water right may not survive." Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27,
42 (Colo. 1997).
The restriction probably changes the original intent of the
appropriation and would kill the right if the restriction clearly frustrated the original
intent and the right could not be changed to another use that complied with the
restriction. Another issue is whether a covenant not to develop a conditional water
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are appurtenant to the water rights donated to TNC.14 9
In another transaction, the city of Boulder entered into an
"equitable servitude" on Barker Meadow Reservoir with Public Service
Company of Colorado to share the use of the reservoir and
transmission facilities. 50 The servitude covered a water storage right
and associated transmission facilities.'
In addition to using the
reservoir's storage capacity, the company retained the right to take
stored water owned by the city in an emergency.5 2 The agreement
between Boulder and Public Service Company meets the legal
requirements of an equitable servitude, but not a real covenant
5 The agreement
because privity did not exist."
is appurtenant because
both parties have benefited property. Thus, it is not strictly analogous
to the classic form of a conservation easement in gross.

M.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USING CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS ON WATER IN COLORADO

It is eminently possible to structure some conservation easements
mandating particular water rights uses as affirmative obligations as well
as negative restrictions. For example, a servitude tying water rights to
the land and requiring the continuation of their historic agricultural
use implies an affirmative obligation to maintain the means of
diversion and the place of water use. Similarly, a servitude obligating
the use of a water right to maintain a wetland, or other waterdependent natural area, benefits appurtenant land.
Where the only resulting beneficial use is purely instream, the
conservation benefit and water right will lack security unless the
grantor or grantee negotiates with the CWCB to obtain a water court

right implies that the appropriator does not have a use for the water. If so, the water
right could violate Colorado's anti-speculation doctrine. See Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566, 568 (Colo. 1979). The
court extended the anti-speculation doctrine to hexennial diligence proceedings in
MunicipalSubdistrict, N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.Oxy USA, Inc., 990 P.2d 701, 709
(Colo. 1999). Invalidating the right would have the same effect as the covenant from
the beneficiary's perspective; it would prevent development of the conditional water
right. The IRS might deny a charitable deduction on the ground that the restriction
abandons the water right, and thus there was no value to donate. While an attractive
argument to the IRS, it is specious; a water right exists until a court declares it
abandoned. For illustration, a building that burns down after donation had value at
the time of its bequest. Similarly, a water right is capable of donation and has value
until declared abandoned.
149. Memorandum from Wigington, supra note 147, at 2.
150. AGREEMENT BETWEEN PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO AND CITY OF
BOULDER 7-9 (May 7, 1984) (on file with author). The city of Boulder purchased the
reservoir in 2001, thus the servitude is no longer in force.
151. Id.at 6.
152. Id.at 9-10.
153. The agreement is written and therefore complies with the statute of frauds. See
id. Both parties intended to bind their successors and assigns. Id. at 28. The covenant
touches and concerns the water rights because it prescribes the conditions of their use
by both parties. Id. at 8-12. The covenant was recorded giving notice to successors
and assigns. Id. at 30.
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decree changing the water right to instream use.'54 Clearly, a servitude
calling for the release of stored water for instream purposes is an
affirmative obligation. It is also possible to structure a restriction on
the release of stored water as an affirmative obligation to maintain a
littoral level. To the extent any of these instream flow strategies
comprise positive obligations, the common law's avoidance of negative
servitudes in gross is circumvented. Structuring a servitude as an
affirmative obligation should improve its probability of surviving
judicial scrutiny.
All of the approaches using servitudes to maintain irrigation,
wetlands and riparian areas, and to increase instream flows can also
benefit appurtenant property.'55 For example, water used to irrigate
agricultural land, and to maintain wetlands and other waterdependent natural areas benefits appurtenant land. Analogously,
water decreed and released or held by the CWCB for instream use
benefits riparian land. The servitude for an instream flow could be
attached to a riparian and benefited anchor parcel, including one
acquired for this purpose. On public lands, a servitude could benefit
adjacent federal land under the care of the Forest Service,'5 6 or the
Bureau of Land Management. The use of a benefited anchor parcel
avoids the common law problems associated with servitudes in gross. 57
Taken together, these two strategies-creating affirmative
obligations and benefiting appurtenant land-provide an approach
that avoids the few legal uncertainties surrounding conservation
easements on water rights. In order to maximize the enforceability of
the servitude against successors in interest (to control the use of water
in perpetuity), it is prudent to adopt both proposed strategies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the typical conservation easement in gross on irrigated
agricultural or open space land does not follow the recommended
approach, it is time to revise this practice. Many members of the water
and land trust organizations recognize the problem and are working to
address it.
University of Denver Law Professor Federico Cheever argues "[t ] he
limited, novel, and statutory nature of conservation easements suggests
that any purported conservation restriction that fails to meet the
154. Absent such a decree, the water right would be subject to abandonment for
failure to divert it for its decreed beneficial use. Thus, a water right holder desiring to
convert a water right to instream flow must work with the CWCB to obtain a change of
water right to such a purpose.
155. See id., regarding other legal requirements to secure the conservation benefit
and water right.
156. This appears to be the situation in a conservation servitude granted by the city
of Fort Collins to the Forest Service on Joe Wright Creek. E-mail from Kelly Custer,
Esq., Attorney, Western Water Project, Trout Unlimited, to author (Oct. 17, 2001).
157. To secure an instream flow right also requires a water court decree for instream
flow purposes. The CWCB has exclusive statutory authority to hold instream flows. See
supra note 1.
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requirements of the state statute that authorizes it is invalid, supported
by neither legislative action nor common law tradition."51 8 While a

well-crafted conservation easement should stand up under Colorado
common law, Professor Cheever's admonition suggests a safer course
of action.
Assuming the Colorado General Assembly can be
convinced, legislative clarification of the state's conservation easement
statute on water rights is the most direct approach to resolving the
issue regarding the enforcement of conservation easements on water.

158. Cheever, supra note 44, at 1096.

